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TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, Inc.,
a Minnesota corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

Case No. 19216

v.
STATE OF UTAH, EDWARD T. ALTER,
in his capacity as Treasurer
of the State of Utah, and VAL
OVESON, in his capacity as
Auditor of the State of Utah,
Defendants and
Appellants.
00O00

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff-Respondent, Travelers Express Company, Inc.,
petitions this Court, under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure for rehearing and reargument of the above-entitled
matter.

Plaintiff-Respondent, in recognition of the significant

and burdensome demands on the time and resources of the Court, has
made its decision to petition for rehearing only after long and
deliberate consideration of the basis for such a request.

This

petition is not, therefore, made lightly or upon any normally
expected losing party or attorney incredulity over an adverse
decision.
The Court has chosen to overrule its previous decision in
State ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 668 P.2d
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503 (Utah 1983), in reliance upon the dissenting opinion of a
justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in a case
which was decided and published after briefing and oral argument
by the parties in this case.

While it is not the petitioner's

contention that the Court should refrain from consideration of
relevant decisions by courts made subsequent to briefing and
argument of cases before it; it is the contention of the
petitioner that under the circumstances involved here, it is not
within the bounds of fairness or judicial wisdom to do so without
allowing the parties the opportunity to provide the light that
opposing argument can bring to the interpretation and application
of such additional references.
In particular, where the Court, as in this instance,
(i) applies and adopts reasoning from a dissent in a case decided
in the Supreme Court of another jurisdiction, which opinion
is not, of course, precedent in that jurisdiction;1 (ii) bases
its rationale for such application and adoption upon, what this
petitioner believes can be shown to be an erroneous

lr

The Court appears to place heavy reliance upon the
reasoning and arguments advanced by Justice Dore in the dissenting
portion of his concurring and dissenting opinion in the Washington
State Supreme Court case of State Department of Revenue v. Puget
Sound Power, 103 Wash. 2d 501, 694 P.2d 7, 13-16 (1985). More
importantly, the dissent is made in the face of a majority and,
therefore, binding legal conclusion for the State of Washington,
which actually is in agreement with (a) the position of petitioner,
(b) the conclusions of the trial court in the case at bar and
(c) the conclusions of this Court in the decision overruled by the
opinion from which Petitioner is now taking exception.

-2-
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assessment of the law in effect (which error this Court, by
adoption, shares); (iii) by such application and adoption,

Continued:
In Puget Sound, the State sought utility deposits and
dividends paid on deposits under Washington's Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act which was amended in 1979 to include Section 16.
That Court's majority said:
The Washington Legislature enacted the
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act in
1955. The measure is an almost exact duplicate
of the model UPA. 8A U.L.A. 223 (1983).
Significantly, the model UPA has a section which
provides that periods of limitations shall not be
a bar to the state's right to the property. UPA
§ 16, 8A U.L.A. 257 (1983). The Washington
Legislature chose not to include that provision
when it enacted Washington's UPA. The Department
twice tried unsuccessfully to amend the UPA,
first to provide access to certain abandoned
property before the owner's statute of
limitations had run, and then to add § 16 of the
model UPA. Unable to convince the Legislature,
the Department finally adopted its own rule in
1968 which closely paralleled UPA § 16. This
court struck down the regulation as being beyond
the rulemaking power of the agency. Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Rev.,
78 Wash.2d 961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971). Finally, in
1979 the Legislature enacted RCW 63.28.225 which
is a codification of UPA § 16.

The Department cites cases from other
jurisdictions which have refused to permit
statutes of limitations to preclude the state's
right to abandoned property. However, reliance
to those cases is mistaken. . . . The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted a
provision of its abandoned property act to
require reporting of abandoned property even
after the owners' rights had ceased. Treasurer
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overturns not only the decision of the trial court, but its own
well-reasoned precedent from a prior case; and further, and more

Continued:
and Receiver General v. John Hancock Must, Life
Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 410, 446 N.E.2d 1376 (1983).
However, there the court was interpreting a
substantially different abandoned property scheme
and specific statutory language which does not
appear in our UPA. Although the sentiment the
court expresses appears relevant, the factual
differences in the cases make it unpersuasive in
this situation.
The California legislature adopted an
abandoned property statute similar to
Washington's in 1959. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§§ 1500-1527 (West 1982). Their statute,
however, included a provision, similar to § 16
of the model UPA, which requires an abandoned
property report despite the availability of a
limitations defense against the owner. While
deciding a holder's statute of limitations
defense to a claim by the state, the California
Supreme Court took pains to clarify that the
statute applied only to claims on which the
statute of limitations had run between the holder
and the owner after the effective date of the
statute. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v. Cranston,
58 Cal.2d 462, 466, 374 P.2d 819, 24 Cal. Rptr.
851 (1962). The analysis supports Puget's
position that prior to Washington's adoption of
RCW 63.28.225, the limitations defense available
against the owner was applicable against the
Department as well.
* * *

[6] Based on the legislative history of
the UPA and our prior case law, we find that the
Department had no greater right to the utility
deposits abandoned between 1955 and 1979 than
did the owners. Since the owners' rights were
extinguished after 6 years, the Department has no
right to those deposits presumed abandoned after
7 years. (Emphasis added)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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importantly, (iv) by so doing, engages in what this petitioner can
only conclude is impermissible "judicial legislation"; further
argument and briefing afforded by a rehearing is clearly justified.
Indeed, justice mandates such opportunity for both parties in the
interest of avoiding the establishment of precedent which petitioner
believes that the Court, after due reconsideration, would not wish
to be established for this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The assertion of the author of the dissenting opinion

in the Washington State Supreme Court case and in other cases cited
by the Court, that allowing application of the statute of
limitations provision would "virtually nullify" the State's
Unclaimed Property Act, is erroneous.

Accordingly, the adoption of

that assertion as a valid conclusion and basis for reasoning by the
Court in this case is also erroneous.

II.

If the State's Unclaimed Property Act is, in fact,

not eviscerated by the application of a statute of limitations
exception, then the Court's attempt to circumvent the application
of that exception is impermissible "judicial legislation" and may,

Continued:
Utah's history of the Uniform Act is substantially the
same as Washington's except Washington included Section 16 in 1979
and Utah did not include it until July 1, 1983.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in fact, be in contravention of the actual intent of the
Legislature.

III.

The modified derivative rights rule announced by

the Court in this case does not have a basis in reason, is without
discernible standards for application and is, in any event,
misapplied with respect to this case.

ARGUMENT
I. THE ASSERTION OF THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSENTING OPINION
IN THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT CASE AND IN OTHER CASES
CITED BY THE COURT, THAT ALLOWING APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS PROVISION WOULD VIRTUALLY NULLIFY THE STATE'S
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT IS ERRONEOUS. ACCORDINGLY, THE ADOPTION OF
THAT ASSERTION AS A VALID CONCLUSION AND AS A BASIS FOR REASONING
BY THE COURT IN THIS CASE IS ALSO ERRONEOUS.
The Court, in its opinion, gives considerable attention
to the assertion of Justice Dore, dissenting in the Puget Sound
decision, that the Washington State Supreme Court's prior decision
in Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Department of Revenue,
78 Wash.2d 961 and 481 P.2d 556 (1971) (en banc) (also relied upon
by this Court in its decision in State ex rel Baker) -virtually
nullified this state's unclaimed property act." Supra at 14.

In

Northwest Bell, the Washington Supreme Court had, as did this
court in State ex rel Baker, concluded that where the state
legislature had failed to enact section 16 of the model Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (the -Uniform Act-)
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(providing that the intervention of a statute of limitations could
not be asserted against the State with respect to reporting or
turnover of unclaimed property to the State), the holder of
unclaimed property could assert a statute of limitations defense
to reporting and transfer to the State.

Justice Dore takes great

pains to detail the manner in which the Northwest Bell decision
"nullifies" the Washington State Unclaimed Property Act.

Justice

Dore carefully recites the "abandonment" periods applicable to
each category of property which was covered by Washington's
unclaimed property act (prior to the enactment of Uniform Act
§ 16) and then asserts (without any detailed analysis), that the
applicable periods in every instance, are longer than the statute
of limitations for such property.

Justice Dore then concludes

that the consequences of Northwest Bell are "to effectively repeal
the Act."

This Court apparently buys into that reasoning

wholeheartedly.

This Court, citing similar language in other

cases, repeatedly makes reference to the "frustration of the
public purposes of the Act" and "the absurd result" which arises
from allowing the statute of limitations to be a barrier to the
reporting and turnover rules of this State's unclaimed property
law.2

References in this argument to Utah's unclaimed property
law are to the Utah version of the Uniform Disposition of
Unclaimed Property Act, prior to the 1983 amendments. The 1983
Amendments, as previously indicated, adopted a form of the Uniform
Act, § 16 (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-44-30(1) (1953 as amended)).

-7-
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Petitioner contends, however, that such reliance is
wholly misplaced.

A review of the unclaimed property act

provisions governing the periods required for the presumption of
abandonment as compared to the applicable statute of limitations
rules of this state (both common law and statutory) yield a
conclusion substantially different from that of Justice Dore.

The

State's unclaimed property law is not, in fact, eviscerated by
this Court's holding in State ex rel Baker.

Analysis will lead to

the discovery that the commencement of the period necessary to
presume abandonment does not, in all cases, coincide with the date
on which a "cause of action accrues" under applicable doctrines of
State statutory and common law.

A significant example is to be

found in the area of certificates of deposit.

The seven year

presumption of abandonment period for a certificate of deposit
commences from the "date it is payable" or from "the date of
issuance if it is payable on demand."

Section 70A-3-122 of this

State's Uniform Commercial Code in subsection (2) provides:
"A cause of action against the obligor of a
demand or time certificate of deposit accrues
upon demand, but demand on a time certificate of
deposit may not be made until on or after the
date of maturity."
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-3-122(2) (1953, as amended). Clearly,

<

,

with respect to a demand certificate of deposit, there is
potential for the abandonment period to run before the applicable
statute of limitations since the abandonment period commences

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

running on the date of issuance and the statute of limitations
period will only begin to run upon demand.
Likewise, in the area of bank deposits (see Section
78-44-2 of the Utah Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act pre-1983
amendment) - an area of substantial potential funds and property
for the State - no cause of action against the depository financial
institution would accrue until some demand for withdrawal of the
funds is made by the depositor.

Absent such a demand or request,

then no cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations does
not begin running.

In the meantime, the abandonment period

commences running at any moment after there is an expression of
interest in the account (activity in the account, correspondence
relative to the account, or any other indication of interest in the
account).

Presumably then, the 12 year period with respect to any

such account will run since the last deposit in a savings account
or the last withdrawal.

In this case, by definition, when a 12

year period has run without any such manifestation of interest

#

(including, therefore, a demand for withdrawal), no statute of
limitations defense would be available.

There are other

substantial examples of this same argument to be found in a review
of this state's unclaimed property act (as in effect without the
benefit of Section 16 of the Uniform Act).

Accordingly, the

conclusion of Justice Dore in dissent in the Puget Sound case
clearly is without substance or meaning in this State (whatever
might be its validity with respect to the relationship of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

Washington's version of unclaimed property law and applicable
statute of limitations rules for that state).
It is, therefore, also clear error on the part of this
Court to adopt the Justice Dore conclusion and apply it in this
case and in this State.

The said conclusion, as demonstrated

without equivocation by the above examples, is not borne out by the
state of the law here.
II. IF THE STATE'S UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT IS, IN FACT,
NOT EVISCERATED BY THE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
EXCEPTION, THEN THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE APPLICATION
OF THAT EXCEPTION IS IMPERMISSIBLE "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION" AND MAY,
IN FACT, BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ACTUAL INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE.
Since the statute of limitations exception recognized by
the Court in State ex rel Baker does not, in fact, "virtually
nullify" this State's unclaimed property laws; and, since it is
also not absurd to conclude that the legislature's omission of
Section 16 of the Uniform Act was meant to allow for preservation
of a right repeatedly recognized by this Court as a substantial
and valued vested property right (i.e., the rights obtained or
involved in the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations period), Petitioner believes that it is beyond the
authority and prerogative of this Court to circumvent the impact
of the legislature's actions and inactions.

(The Court is

referred to the cases cited in its own opinion and in the
Petitioner's brief for confirmation of the substantial and
material deference paid to rights arising with respect to statute
of limitations provisions.)

Indeed, such activity is likely

-10-
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defeating the real intention of the legislature, i.e. the preservation of the statute of limitations defenses and exceptions to the
unclaimed property rules while still providing for substantial and
meaningful applications of the unclaimed property laws.
The Court cites in its opinion, the reasoning of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Treasurer and Receiver
General v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 388 Mass. 410,
446 N.E.2d 1376 (1983).

In that case, the Massachusetts court

cites an earlier decision in which it states that "An intention to
enact a barren and ineffective provision is not lightly to be
imputed to the legislature."

A necessary corollary of that

provision must be that where the act of the legislature has any
substantive application, "irrationality or foolishness" in the
omission of some other substantive or material portion of the same
legislation should also "not lightly . . . be imputed to the
legislature."

Indeed, time-honored, well-reasoned, and rationally

imposed rules of judicial restraint surrounding the infringement
of the legislative purview, should be violated only where, in
fact, the "barren nature of legislative activity" is clearly
manifest by the absence of any material applicability of a given
piece of legislation.

Further, even in such instances in which

judicial interpretation can be utilized to preserve some "meaning"
for legislative pronouncements, such interpretation should be
applied rationally and with careful avoidance of tortured
construction and baseless assertions.

This case is not one which

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
-11-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

involves such clearly "barren enactments".

Further, petitioner

respectfully submits, and will hereafter demonstrate, that even if
such were the case, the rationale and rules pronounced by the
Court to provide the asserted missing substance to the subject
legislation are not much more than arbitrary assertions without
any stated foundation in reason.
III. THE MODIFIED DERIVATIVE RIGHTS RULE ANNOUNCED BY
THE COURT IN THIS CASE IS ANNOUNCED WITHOUT ANY STATED BASIS IN
REASON AND IS WITHOUT DISCERNIBLE STANDARDS FOR APPLICATION AND
IS, IN ANY EVENT, MISAPPLIED WITH RESPECT TO THIS CASE.
Even assuming there is a need for the Court to "rescue"
the legislature from the embarrassment of a meaningless and
"barren" enactment (which petitioner has clearly shown is not the
case here), the modified derivative rights rule proposed in the
Court's opinion, is, upon close examination, nothing more than an
arbitrary pronouncement.

This Court in State ex rel Baker,

without qualification or equivocation, adopted the view that
the rights of the State under its unclaimed property act are
•

••derivative."

In short, the State must stand in the shoes of the

"owner" of the property which is the subject of the unclaimed
property law.

It is apparent that there are substantial

constitutional issues bound up in the Court's adoption of the
derivative rights rule.

However, time and space do not allow

elaboration of the same at this point in time.
In the opinion of the Court in the case at bar, without
any apparent attempt to explain the rationale for the adoption of
the same (except to say that the effect of such adoption is to

-12-
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<

"save" the unclaimed property law from nullification and except
for citation to another court's similar and apparently arbitrary
adoption of the same), the Court adopts a modification of the
derivative rights rule.

That modification states that (a) the

state's rights are derivative only to "substantive" rights, as
opposed to procedural rights, and (b) that the statute of
limitations is a "procedural" right.

As pointed out above, this

bald "pronouncement" is made in reliance upon a citation to the
similar conclusion reached by the Supreme Courts of Alabama and
Pennsylvania (reference is made to the Court's opinion for the
citations to the same).

Again, except for asserting the need to

avoid the embarrassing admission that the legislature enacted
"barren" legislation, in neither of these cited cases does the
court making the decision state any rational basis for the
imposition of the rule.

If there is independent and substantive

rationale and reason (in experience or otherwise) for the
imposition of such rules, none are cited either by the referenced
courts or by this Court.

If in fact, the imposition of such rules

has foundation in reason and logic (derived from policy,
precedent, statute, or otherwise), none appears.

Petitioner

submits that the legitimacy of the rule of law in this State and
in this country is threatened by the pronouncement of rules, the
only stated justification for which, are the conclusions which the
announcing court has deemed and pronounced desirable.

While there

may be, in fact, rational and logical underpinnings for the
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Court's stated rule, they remain unspoken in the opinion
promulgated by the Court.
Petitioner is particularly concerned by the absence of
stated reasoning for the adoption of of the second element of the
modified derivative rights rule.

As pointed out above, the rights

derived by parties through assertion of the statute of limitations
have traditionally and consistently been placed in the category of
vested property rights.

The apparently gratuitous assertion in

the case at bar that they are "procedural" (whatever that means)
is disconcerting and potentially disruptive to existing law in a
wide scope of circumstances wholly unrelated to the statute at
issue here.

In light of the significance of such a pronouncement,

if the Court still believes it necessary to attempt a preservation
of the unclaimed property act by assertion of such rules, it is
appropriate and necessary to allow all parties to brief and
reargue the subject case on such issues before the Court adopts
the same as the rules applicable in this State.

CONCLUSION
The petitioner respectfully submits, that the foregoing
more than sufficiently justifies a rehearing in this matter.
Clear error in conclusions about the effect and status of the
subject law has occurred.

Accordingly, petitioner requests that

rehearing be granted and that opportunity be provided to all
parties for rebriefing and argument.
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DATED this ^2?

day of January, 1987 •
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

L. Ridd Larson
Attorneys for Petitioner

RULE 3 5 CERTIFICATE

Counsel for petitioner hereby certifies that this
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay*

L, RIDD LARSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

*

I hereby certify that on the 29th day of January, 1987,
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition For
Rehearing were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the
following:
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General
Joseph P. McCarthy
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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